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FAITH AND OBLIGATION,
OR WHAT MAKES SANDY SWEAT?
Frank I. Michelman*
"There is... no transhistorical criterion for 'thinking like a... lawyer,' other than an
abiding faith in the basic constitutional enterprise. "I
Is the Constitution of the United States a sort of thing that anyone in this
country, acting individually, can choose to reject? In what sense? With what
consequence? What is it that one does, takes on, or enters into by "acceptance" of
the Constitution, either by a public act (say, an oath), or in focused, private
thought? And what, exactly is the Constitution, regarded as a possible object of
personal commitment? Sanford Levinson takes up these questions in his book
Constitutional Faith.2 Below, in Parts II and IV, I engage in a dissection of
Levinson's treatments of them-committing, no doubt, the offense that
Kierkegaard wincingly called "slic[ing] the author into paragraphs .... I do so
not idly, however, but prompted by questions arising from other work in which I
recently have been engaged,4 so let us begin with that.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION
A. The Constitution as Law and as a Basis of Obligation
The Constitution, no doubt, is many things to many people. To all, however,
it is law (whatever else it also may be), and it's as law that we shall regard it here.5
The Constitution could not conceivably have figured as it has in our country's
history, and as it does in our lives today, had it not from the start and throughout
been widely perceived as a body of legal norms, compliance and non-compliance
with which carry pivotal legal consequences within our particular system of legal
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.
1. Paul Brest, Sanford Levinson, J.M. Balkin & Akhil Reed Amar, Processes of Constitutional
Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials xxxi (4th ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 2000).
2. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton U. Press 1988).
3. See Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling-Preface, in Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and
Trembling and the Sickness unto Death 22, 24 (Walter Lowrie trans., Princeton U. Press 1954).
4. See e.g. Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution as Legitimation Contract, 8 Rev. Constitutional
Stud. - (forthcoming 2003).
5. See e.g. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 54 (calling the Constitution "the very fountainhead of the
American legal system").
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ordering. No decree can count as valid law here if it visibly issues from outside
constitutionally authorized institutions and procedures, or otherwise fails to
6comply with constitutional requirements. We can grant that judgments of
constitutionality do not always entirely settle questions of civic obligation. There
sometimes may be prevailing reasons-even reasons of civic responsibility-to
break evil laws you consider constitutional; just as there also sometimes may be
prevailing civic (or other) reasons to abide by evil laws you think are not.7 But if
judgments of constitutionality are not always strictly decisive of civic duties
respecting the law, they surely often are and surely always have a bearing. Else
what's a Constitution for?
8
The premise that the Constitution is law leaves open some huge questions.
That premise does not settle whether the corpus of normative material of which
the Constitution is composed, from which its applied meanings are to be
expounded as occasion requires, consists of the parchment text alone or that plus a
surrounding interpretive tradition, perhaps viewed through a scrim of truths
evident to reason. The former is what Levinson calls a "protestant," the latter
what he calls a "catholic" view.9 Nor, if we follow Levinson, does the premise of
the-constitution-as-law settle who does the expounding. It does not settle whether
I, when in doubt, am to learn the concrete requirements of constitutional legality
from what some hierarchically paramount, central authority from time to time
declares them to be (a "catholic" view), or rather I am to learn them by applying
to the case my own relevant powers of research and reason (a "protestant" view). 10
The fact remains that most American minds posit something identifiable as
the Constitution, conditioning someone's legally potent judgments of
constitutionality and unconstitutionality. Suppose we adopt a "catholic-
protestant" stance, as Levinson does." We take an expansive, non-literalist, "text-
plus" view of interpretative method, while insisting on every individual's
6. In the lingo of jurisprudence, the Constitution acts in our legal system as a "secondary rule" and
"rule of recognition." See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 89-107 (Oxford U. Press 1961);
Michelman, supra n. 4, at pt. II(B). Perhaps the Constitution-as-law has not at every moment from its
birth figured clearly as a recognition-rule in the American legal system. See Larry D. Kramer, The
Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 5-33 (2001) (distinguishing
between the Constitution as "fundamental" law and the Constitution as "supreme," "ordinary" law). It
has done so steadily, however, for a very long time.
7. See e.g. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 320-23 (rev. ed., Belknap Press of Harv. U. Press 1999)
(discussing "civil disobedience" as distinguished from "conscientious refusal").
8. I do not mean to suggest that constitutions as a class have no other or broader purpose or effect
than to settle certain questions of legal validity or of civic obligation. See e.g. Cass R. Sunstein,
Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do 6 (Oxford U. Press 2001) ("[T]he central goal of a
constitution is to create the preconditions for a well-functioning democratic order .... "). I do mean to
suggest that constitutions could not very well serve those other purposes, or have those other effects, if
they did not also figure as law.
9. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 18-19, 47. I will sometimes refer to the "catholic" view as a "text-plus"
view.
10. See id. at 23-27. There are also, of course, less radically individualist non-catholic views to
consider: that constitutional interpretive authority belongs to the people collectively (a "Quaker"
view?), or to sundry heads of governmental districts and departments to work out among themselves as
best they can (an "episcopal" view?).
11. Id. at 51; see id. at47.
[Vol. 38:651
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responsibility to use that method to reach his or her own judgments regarding
constitutionality. This need not mean we feel free to obstruct enforcement of any
judicial ruling on constitutionality with which we disagree. It does mean we won't
allow judicial rulings automatically to displace our own judgments, or in that way
to saturate our understandings of civic obligation.12 In our eyes, issues of
constitutionality obviously remain both serious and legal. They are serious
inasmuch as we conceive the contents of people's civic obligations to depend on
them significantly. 3 They are legal inasmuch as we demand that anyone
purporting to decide them do so by honest attempts to discern and apply the law
of the Constitution. "[R]ejection of institutional authority," the Levinsonian
protestant takes pains to insist, "is not ... the equivalent of ... rejection of the
binding authority of the Word (or Law) itself."' 4
We speak of effects on people's civic obligations, but what sort of effect have
we in view? Suppose there is some act, or process, or form of concentration of the
mind, by which an inhabitant of the United States can be said to "accept" or
"reject" the Constitution. (Constitutional Faith, as we'll see in Part II, is reared
upon the conceit that there is, and not just for immigrants and office-takers.) One
gives the Constitution the once-over, let us say, finds it up to snuff as far as
constitutions go, and says, in effect, "Okay, let's run with it." A commitment of
some kind apparently will have been made (otherwise what's the point?), but
exactly what sort of commitment? Is "accepting" the Constitution like signing a
contract? Does one thereby impose on oneself any new restriction on one's future
freedom of action, or even of judgment regarding the moral status of actions you
or others might take? Can "acceptance" of the Constitution have any such effect,
if one holds a Levinsonian "protestant" view of where the authority lies to
construe the Constitution?
B. Legitimacy
The question of the obligations one assumes by "signing" one's country's
constitution is maddeningly elusive and complex, and I want to isolate for
consideration here a single strand of it on which I have found Constitutional Faith
to shed a particular light. In order to get that strand in focus, we'll need to
introduce the notion of normative political legitimacy.
Very briefly:15 As Levinson notes, drily but not disapprovingly, "the state is
,,16
usually interested in imposing notions of obligation upon everyone ....
12. This, famously, was Abraham Lincoln's view, specifically as directed to the decision of the
Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U:S. 393 (1857). See e.g. The Collected Works of
Abraham Lincoln vol. II, at 494-96 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers U. Press 1953) (Speech at Chicago, Ill.,
July 10, 1858).
13. See infra pt. II(B).
14. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 25. Levinson adds: "Instead, the most radical protestant might hold, it is
up to each member of the faith community.., to decide what the Word actually requires." Id. at 25-
26.
15. I have drawn what follows substantially from Michelman, supra n. 4.
16. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 113.
20031
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Governments demand compliance with their laws and use force, when needed, to
secure it. Questions arise as to whether anyone ever has a morally justified
complaint about such uses of force by the government, and the answers often are
said to depend on the "legitimacy" of the laws in question or of the governmental
regime that seeks to effectuate them.
17
It seems that to judge a law (in this sense) legitimate, one need not judge it
right, or just, or morally blameless, or a work in which the maker can take pride.
One can judge the law unjust and badly misguided, and nevertheless legitimate.
One can do so insofar as one judges respect-worthy-worth having, supporting,
and preserving-the entire governmental system, or practice, that produced the
law, despite that system's having produced the bad law and maybe others as bad
or worse. (The ability combined with the willingness to make such affirmative but
troubled judgments turns out, I believe, to be much of what Levinson means by
"constitutional faith. '' 5) The core idea is that if the system taken whole is respect-
worthy, worth upholding, then the state is, so to speak, within its rights enforcing
every law that issues from the system, including even those that you or I or Judge
Whosis may consider to be very bad and immoral ones. 9
It is no mystery why you or I might be disposed to think this way. Our
political culture is one in which people associate certain commanding moral and
other practical goods with the practice of positive legal ordering, or call it
government by law (or by democracy). Government by law prevails to the extent
that inhabitants of a country are predominantly disposed: (a) to conform their
conduct to rules and principles pronounced to be law there by some distinct class
or classes of officials, (b) to organize their activities with a view to compatibility
with such official pronouncements, and (c) to support, or at least to accept, the use
of social force to secure compliance in general with such pronouncements.
Government by law, people feel certain, can carry with it, for everyone,
inestimable goods of social coordination, pacification, and justice 20-and let us not
fail to include the communitarian good of respect for and cooperation with fellow
citizens engaged in democratic processes of lawmaking. 21 People further believe
that achievement of these goods will not be possible, unless laws issuing from an
17. See e.g. Allen Buchanan, Political Legitimacy and Democracy, 112 Ethics 689, 691-692 (2002).
We speak here, of course, of "legitimacy" in its normative, not its descriptive sense. See id. at 689.
18. See infra pt. II(C).
19. Some may say the case I have just posited is an impossibility, because a regime that insists on
enforcing laws that really are immoral is ipso facto incapable of deserving respect. I offer no case
against such a view. My claim is only that whoever holds it has no use for the notion of legitimacy.
Legitimacy, by my understanding, is a concept that finds breathing space only within a scheme of
thought allowing that people in a state can be justified in supporting the state's enforcement of bad and
immoral laws.
20. This conviction flows from Kantian as well as Hobbesian inspirations. See Jeremy Waldron, The
Dignity of Legislation 36-62 (Cambridge U. Press 1999); Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of
Justice: Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals § 42 (John Ladd trans., 2d ed., Hackett Publg. Co., Inc.
1999); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan chs. 13-17 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier Books 1962) (1651).
21. See Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 100 (Clarendon Press 1999) ("[T]he demand that
interests me ... is a demand for a certain sort of recognition and ... respect-that this, for the time
being, is what the community has come up with and that it should not be ignored or disparaged simply
because some of us propose, when we can, to repeal it.").
[Vol. 38:651.
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on-the-whole respect-worthy, on-the-whole democratic political system are
considered generally binding on everyone, regardless of any individual's opinion
of a given law's merit or justice 2  Accordingly, as long we believe the
governmental system, on the whole, to be democratically respect-worthy, we
will-at any rate, we can-believe that a general, presumptive commitment to
enforcement of every law issuing from it is justified. (Note that this is not the
same as saying anyone has even a presumptive moral obligation to comply with
every law.23 A pacifist patriot can, with perfect logical consistency, reject any
moral obligation on his part to comply with military-service orders while
conceding that the government is justified in demanding compliance and
punishing non-compliance . 24)
For good reason, then, we want to be a country governed by law. That want
ensnares us, inevitably, in a mobilization of coercion upon all to comply with all
formally valid acts of lawmaking and legal interpretation, regardless of what any
individual may think of the moral and other merits of any given law. For that, we
want justification, and "legitimacy" is its name. "Legitimate" is what you plead in
response to a fellow-citizen's complaint against compulsion to comply with a legal
act that he believes to be wrong on the merits and you cannot demonstrate to be
right and maybe are not at all sure is right. In making the plea, you do not take
yourself off the hook for supporting enactment of a wrong and bad law (supposing
you did support it). You only take yourself off the hook for supporting compulsion
against him to comply with the law-which, presumably, you do out of respect for
the moral and other practical goods of the general social venture of government
by law and for the sake of that venture's success. But of course you cannot stake
anything on the venture's success if you do not find respect-worthy, on the whole,
the particular system of government by law that is in force in your country.
At this point, we can state with middling precision the question regarding
political obligation on which I have found Constitutional Faith to shed a particular
light, even though Levinson does not ever raise it in anything like my terms. By
"accepting" the Constitution, does one obligate oneself never to count as a black
mark against the respect-worthiness of American government the enactment or
enforcement of any law (or legal interpretation) that is not unconstitutional?
Does one, in effect, subscribe to the Constitution as a kind of public contract-a
publicly binding statement of the terms of a political association that citizens are
morally justified in supporting, using whatever force those terms permit to secure
compliance with laws enacted in accordance with them?
For reasons I explain partly below, 25 I had come to doubt that the
Constitution's place in our lives and politics is best understood in such a
22. See e.g. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln vol. 1, at 112-13 (Roy B. Basler ed., 1953
Rutgers U. Press) (Address Before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, I11., Jan. 27, 1838).
23. See Buchanan, supra n. 17, at 693-95.
24. Cf Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913).
25. See infra pt. III.
2003]
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contractualist frame. My recent revisitation to Levinson's book, undertaken for
this symposium, has led me to reconsider my doubt, although not finally to
withdraw it. The doubt surely holds-I maintain-if we take a "catholic" view of
the social organization of constitutional-interpretative authority. Does it hold if
we take up a "protestant" stance? My answer will be that it does, but for different
reasons.
26
Having put my concerns on the table, I turn now to a short tour of
Levinson's book.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
If what I have said so far is right, we all have reason to concern ourselves
with the question of the respect-worthiness of our country's system of
government, on which depends the presumptive legitimacy of the laws that issue
from that system and, with it, the justification of our own collaboration in the
subjection of everyone to pressure to comply with every one of those laws, right or
wrong. Constitutional Faith fairly may be read as a disquisition on what, if
anything, the Constitution has to do with judgments of the respect-worthiness of
the American system of government.
A. Constitutional "Attachment" and Personal Identity: A Distraction?
The time is late in the 1980s; the place the historic house of the Second Bank
of United States in Philadelphia; the occasion a public display by the National
Park Service of the original, parchment charter styled "Constitution of the United
States of America." The Park Service also has placed on the site two scrolls, as if
to represent white space at the foot of the original parchment, open to further
signatures.21 Visitors to the shrine-the Service named its bicentennial exhibition
"Miracle in Philadelphia" 2 _-not only thus are invited to add their names to the
list of subscribers to the Constitution, they are explicitly challenged by the
exhibitors with the question whether they "'will"' or will not do so.29
In Constitutional Faith, Sanford Levinson recalls the scene and in it himself,
pondering this unsought-for choice whether to "ratify" or "reject" the
Constitution. 3° Now Sandy, as I'll call this character in Levinson's book, figures as
312a sort of Everyman." Sandy is us, Levinson's tuned-in readers.32 If we had been
there, would we have signed?
3
26. See infra pt. IV.




31. Throughout, I'll use "Sandy" to refer to character who sweats the do-I-sign-or-don't-I question
at the Philadelphia exhibit, and "Levinson" to refer to the chronicler-analyst author of Constitutional
Faith.
32. Levinson addresses "highly self-conscious persons willing to engage in" the sort of reflection
that he recounts in his book. Id. at 184.
33. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 180.
[Vol. 38:651
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Why worry? What risk if we don't? What risk if we do?
Start with if we don't. If we are foreign born and seeking citizenship, refusal
ever to "sign" the Constitution obviously carries a heavy price. Sandy, however, is
native born and "Miracle in Philadelphia" is not a naturalization ceremony. It is
true that when Levinson turns in his book to explaining and defending the practice
of requiring would-be citizens from abroad to declare support for the
Constitution, he does so in terms that potentially apply to everyone here, not just
to those who arrive from offshore. It's a big country, he notes, inhabited by
people who are "strangers" to one another and consequently need some way to
know which of their neighbors they can "count on... to have agreed on a minimal
common way of life .... ,34 Vows can provide the requisite signal. "Vows...
signify . . . a willingness to remain within [the] boundaries" set by a particular
community.35
Doubtless these signaling functions of oaths are useful and important ones.
However, they cannot be what make Sandy sweat in Philadelphia. I mean, picture
Sandy, pen in hand, hesitating before those Park Service scrolls. Is he worried
that, if he doesn't sign, the absence of his name from the lists might be noticed?
Its absence, along with the missing names of two-hundred-odd million fellow
citizens who also have not signed, might tarnish his reputation for Americanism?
Please.
Very well. What do we risk if we do sign? The question, of course, assumes
that we take the affair seriously. We don't just dismiss the exhibitors' invitation as
"trivial gimmickry," 36 or our "signing" as a meaningless formality, as Levinson
reports some of his students do when they sign a statement put before them by bar
examiners, pledging them to abide by the terms of a Code of Professional
Responsibility that in fact they never have read.37 To the contrary, one is not, on
Levinson's stipulation, to sign unless one then and there believes that the system
of governance currently carried on in the Constitution's name is "sufficiently
protective of liberty and helpful to achieving justice that it deserves ... support., 31
So there we glimpse something that one plainly does risk or commit by signing-
that is, one's opinion, then and there, that the Constitution one signs is in that way
"worthy of respect. 3 9 But then what, after all, is the risk? That one will sign and
be mistaken? That one may at some later time be caught out, if only by oneself, in
an error of speculative judgment? An academic's greatest fear, perhaps? Maybe
34. Id. at 119.
35. Id. at 99. Levinson extends the thought to the oaths prescribed by the Constitution for those
assuming judicial and other offices. He recalls approvingly the view of the early, eminent Pennsylvania
judge, John Bannister Gibson, who was taking issue with John Marshall's reasoning in Marbury v.
Madison when he remarked that the judicial oath is not so much designed to bind the taker to an
obligation as to provide "'a test of the political principles of the man' to whom we are about to entrust
a share of the power to govern us. Id. at 122 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Eakin v. Raub, 12 S & R.
330, 353 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting)). See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178, 180 (1803).
36. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 182.
37. Id. at 183.
38. Id. at 191.
39. Id. at 54 (emphasis omitted).
2003]
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for some, but not for Sanford Levinson. To shrink from that risk would surely, in
his view, be a betrayal of our calling as academics.
As Levinson would have it, Sandy before the scrolls is being tested for
something other and more than his good or bad judgment, morals, or taste as a
constitution-appraiser. He is being tested for faith. Sandy faces, in a way, the test
of his life, because the outcome-so Levinson suggests-carries with it the news
that Sandy is or is not, if not exactly among the saved, then at any rate among the
faithful and even, in a sense that is not entirely facetious, the elect. Under test are
Sandy's faith and along with it his identity, the very stuff of the self. "Our answer.
is... a sign of our willingness to join in affirming a 'constitutional faith ....
That faith, in turn, or the lack of it, is a sign of "membership," or the lack of it, in a
"particular community.",41 Thus, in signing or not signing, one gains or loses
"everything, i.e., one's true identity as a member-or rejector-of a peculiar
American fellowship.,
42
Behold, then, Sandy, poised achingly at the chasm.43 Will I sign or not?
Have I faith or not? Am I American or not?
Can all this really be at stake? On what ground does Levinson suggest it is
or might be? On the ground that American identity-or "the notion" thereof-is
peculiar among national identities in having an "ideological nature.'"4 (Is this an
oddly essentialist claim to be emanating from the likes of Levinson?45) According
to this view, which Levinson attributes to such widely assorted authorities as
Samuel P. Huntington 46 and Frances Wright,47 national identity for Americans is
not, as it is for other peoples, a complex, historically evolved product of common
ancestry, experience, ethnicity, language, and culture. It is simply and only a
matter of "espousal" of a certain "creed" 48-one that is identified with the
Constitution, or is deemed to be contained in it.49  America is a "faith
40. Id. at 180-81.
41. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 184.
42. Id.
43. I echo Robert Cover's words describing Abraham with Isaac at Mount Moriah-not the Bible's
Abraham, it needs to be said, but Kierkegaard's. See Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery
and the Judicial Process 4 (Yale U. Press 1975). On the Cover-Levinson connection, see Aviam Soifer,
Speech, Secular Sectarianism and Perilous Neutrality (Tulsa, Okla., Nov. 1, 2002).
44. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 183.
45. Cf. Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1597, 1631-34 (1991) (on the temporal relativity of authenticity).
46. See Levinson, supra n. 2, at 95-96. An eminent, longtime Harvard political scientist, Samuel
Huntington currently is Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor at Harvard, Director of the
John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, and Chairman of the Harvard Academy of International
and Area Studies. See http://www.gov.harvard.edu/Faculty/Bios/Huntington.htm (last updated Jan. 14,
2003).
47. See Levinson, supra n. 2, at 5. Frances ("Fanny") Wright was "'an Americanized Englishwoman
of the 1820s."' See id. at 5 (quoting Werner Sollors, Beyond Ethnicity: Consent and Descent in
American Culture 152 (Oxford U. Press 1986)). She was a noted commentator on American affairs,
and a political and social activist. See Fanny Wright, <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/REwright.
htm> (last updated May 7, 2002).
48. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 183.
49. Levinson conceives of "signing" the Constitution as "an act of 'personal ratification' of what is
presumptively embedded within it." Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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community,"5 ° and the Constitution is its gospel. So to be renegade from
constitutional faith is to be not thickly American, is to be a mere resident alien in
this land-happy, no doubt, to accept the benefits of being here but lacking "the
density of felt membership"5 in what is at one and the same time a "political
order, 5 2 and a national "fellowship.,
53
As American political anthropology, this is entertainable. In Levinson's
hands, it is richly suggestive, informative, and stimulating. As an account of what
makes Sandy sweat in Philadelphia, it has problems.
Levinson sets this up, in effect, as a syllogism. Major premise: to be
American is to be someone who can and does espouse a certain normative object
called the Constitution. More precisely, to know oneself as American is to
discover, when occasion demands, that one has it in oneself to make the espousal.
Minor premise (assumed): Sandy makes it. Sandy has it. QED: Sandy is
American (phew!). That is a tale of self-discovery, or self-confirmation, and it can
work as such only if Sandy genuinely finds himself in doubt about his
Americanness at that moment on the brink, when his signing or not hangs waiting
to be resolved. Now, by Levinson's own testimony, Sandy has never in his life felt
such a doubt! "My refusal to sign the Constitution," Levinson reports, "would
require a much deeper alienation from American life and politics"-he does not
say "from the Constitution"-"than I can genuinely feel (or, indeed, have ever
felt). 54 Far from being determined by his act of signing the Constitution, Sandy's
certainty of his Americanness is what determines him to take that act. The
certainty does not follow from the act but, to the contrary, precedes it.
So suppose we invert the syllogism. Major premise: Sandy is firmly
American and knows it. Minor premise (assumed): Sandy does not sign the
Constitution. QED: Being American, or knowing oneself as such, is not only and
strictly a matter of visitation by constitutional faith. What would follow from
Sandy's not signing, we now see, is only that Sam Huntington's speculation about
what makes a person American is off the mark. Nothing will have been at stake,
during that moment of waiting to see whether Sandy will or will not sign, except
an academic theory of what American identity is or consists of. Levinson
understands this. "If we answer 'no,"' he volunteers, that could be because
equating one's identity as American with one's attachment to the Constitution is
not, after all, a very good "mode of political self-understanding." 55
B. Back on Track: Faith, Judgment, Reason
But there is something more deeply wrong with the self-discovery tale told
by the first syllogism. That tale is, so to speak, one of justification by faith and not
50. Id. at 94.
51. Id. at 181.
52. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 181.
53. Id. at 184
54. Id. at 192.
55. Id. at 181.
2003]
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by works or by reason. It is one of election by grace and not by will or deed. As
such, it is out of kilter with a great deal else in Constitutional Faith, and, I daresay,
in Sanford Levinson.
In the first place, Levinson simply remains too much the liberal to choose
faith over works, or grace over will. For him, to "sign" the Constitution-to
accept the Constitution into that place in one's life that one's country's
constitution is best understood to occupy-plainly is to do something, not just to
show something. It is to modulate in some way one's web of civic commitments
and obligations. According to Levinson, the idea of consent as the key to civic
obligation-notwithstanding that it is incorrigibly "theoretically recalcitrant"-is
56one of those "aspects of the liberal heritage" worth respecting as best one might.
So when Levinson begins his book by asking what "political commitments" an
immigrant to the United States assumes by taking the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution,57 we may take him to use "commitment" in the sense of "obligation."
When he demands of us whether we would have signed those scrolls in
Philadelphia," we may take him similarly to be raising with us the question-
perhaps among others-of what obligations we should understand ourselves to
incur by doing so.
In sum, in Levinson's understanding, attachment to the Constitution is an
act, or a state resulting from an act, that imposes or implies obligation. Could any
doubt remain, two major themes in Constitutional Faith surely would quell it: the
theme, as we may call it, of anti-nihilism and the theme of protestantism.
Repeatedly, before and after the publication of Constitutional Faith,59
Levinson has demurred to stances of "'radical indeterminacy"' regarding legal
texts and legal reason.6° His effort has been to understand and clarify, for himself
and others, how one can "inhabit" responsibly a "practice of [legal] performance
after innocence has been lost" regarding the strict, prescriptive determinacy of
61legal texts and methods. With such an aim in view, Levinson must and does
reject the claim that "any result is possible in any situation ... ,62 He objects
deeply to legal arguments and judicial opinions that seem to him to reflect such a
claim by their bursting of "the bounds of reasonableness., 63  Yet he does also
believe those bounds to be quite lax, at least in constitutional cases where the
"ideological stakes" weigh heavily.
64
56. Id. at 113.
57. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 3.
58. See id. at 180.
59. Most recently in Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism and Legal Academics:
The Roles of Law Professors in the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 Geo. L.J. 173 (2001). See e.g. Levinson &
Balkin, supra n. 45; Jordan Steiker, Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Taking Text and Structure Really
Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 237
(1995); Sanford Levinson, On Interpretation: The Adultery Clause of the Ten Commandments, 58 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 719 (1985).
60. Balkin & Levinson, supra n. 59, at 179.
61. Levinson & Balkin, supra n. 45, at 1658.
62. Balkin & Levinson, supra n. 59, at 179.
63. Id. at 194.
64. Id. at 178-79.
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To think, Levinson says in Constitutional Faith, that agreement on any
corpus of "abstract words" can quiet serious political disputes-"the disputes that
required negotiation in the first place"-is to indulge in a "dream" of a language
immune to "the vagaries of perspective and interpretation. '" 65 "[T]he South," he
says, it seems without fear of contradiction, was able to make "cogent" appeal to
"the same Constitution available to Lincoln . *...,66 Nevertheless, holding such
views, Levinson stubbornly resists-indeed, rejects as "devastating"-the
"nihilist" conclusion that the Constitution is meaningless, or so close to
meaningless as to be not "worth genuinely grappling with as a potential object
either of commitment or of rejection., 67
So: Our man denies the general proposition that "any result is possible in
any situation." Yet he affirms that, in ideologically loaded, constitutional-legal
controversies, it will virtually always be possible for more than one main
ideological contender to produce respectable legal arguments for its favored
outcomes, among which legal reason cannot select objectively.68 True, that is not
to say that "any" result is reachable; there remain in force those "bounds" of
"reasonableness," lax though they may be. Questions obviously remain to be
answered, but it will not be our business here to answer them.69 Right now, our
business is to understand why claims of utter, unbounded, constitutional-legal
meaninglessness should bother Levinson one bit.
Suppose commitment to the Constitution matters in people's lives only as an
expression of faith unreasoned and unchosen, only as a sign of election or
membership. In that case, meaninglessness in the Constitution obviously should
be no cause for worry. (To the contrary, it would seem, the more meaningless the
better.) For Levinson, meaninglessness is a threat because it erases the deed from
"attachment" to the Constitution. Subscription to a meaningless text is nil. It
leaves obligation unaltered. Over and over, Levinson wrestles with the question
of how to square interpretative plasticity with the idea that fealty to the
Constitution binds anyone to anything. The issue of whether the Constitution has
"real" or "stable" content is crucial, he says, because, if it doesn't, then oaths to
support the Constitution fail to establish any "vantage point" by which to assess
the oathtakers' "fidelity to their promises."7 ° We would, in that case, be unable
"confidently [to] ascertain when someone is violating the commitment to be
65. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 125.
66. Id. at 28. Levinson cites Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of
American Political Thought Since the Revolution (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1955). Id. at 28, 202. For
vigorous and dedicated disagreement that "the South's" constitutional arguments could stand up to
Lincoln's for cogency, see Harry V. Jaffa, A New Birth of Freedom: Abraham Lincoln and the Coming
of the Civil War (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2000).
67. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 182.
68. See e.g. Balkin & Levinson, supra n. 59, at 194 ("Most cases that appear before the Supreme
Court could go either way, and so one's objections to court decisions must, in the main, be political
ones.").
69. The answers lie largely in the "historicist" view of legal meaning, developed in Balkin &
Levinson, supra n. 59. See id. at 180-82.
70. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 121.
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bound by [the Constitution's] requirements."71 And Levinson plainly does want
attachment to the Constitution to have real, obligatory "'bite."' 72 It's for that
reason, for example, that he distances himself, at the last, from the suggestion by
Wendell Willkie, counsel in Schneiderman v. United States,73 that the
Constitution's self-stipulated openness to amendment trumps the idea that an oath
to support the Constitution commits the taker to any proposition of substance
whatever, and that all you really swear to by such an oath is your commitment not
to try to change the Constitution (but why then would it matter?) except by the
procedures laid down by Article V.1
4
As an icon for the sort of constitutional-legal nihilism that worries Levinson,
the late Chief Justice Fred Vinson seems at least as apt as Wendell Willkie.
Upholding conviction and punishment of a group of American Communists for
conspiracy to "teach" and "advocate" violent destruction of the United States
government, Vinson attacked the suggestion that the right of "speech" guaranteed
by the First Amendment is or possibly could be "absolute." Nothing is "more
certain in modern society," Vinson wrote, than
the principle that there are no absolutes, that a name, a phrase, a standard has
meaning only when associated with the considerations which gave birth to the
nomenclature. To those who would paralyze our Government in the face of
impending threat by encasing it in a semantic straitjacket we must reply that all
concepts are relative.
7 5
As George Anastaplo later pointed out, that "'principle"' is not one to which
men and women "can pledge themselves," and therefore not one they can use in a
public process of forming themselves into a "'free People.' 76 Anastaplo evidently
believes that to be a sufficient ground for rejecting the principle, and so it appears
would Levinson.
C. "Faith" as Judgment
If the Constitution is the American gospel, then Levinson is adamantly for a
14 77
"protestant" view of the social organization of authority to construe the message.
A constitutional faith, he declares, is "idolatrous" if it means suspension of one's
"independent evaluation" of the tenets of the faith.78 By devoting a book to
showing all the room there is for doubt and debate about exactly what it is, this
71. Id. at 122.
72. Id. at 148.
73. 320 U.S. 119 (1942).
74. See Levinson, supra n. 2, at 137-38, 148, 191.
75. Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951) (citation omitted).
76. George Anastaplo, Abraham Lincoln: A Constitutional Biography 19 (Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc. 1999).
77. As we have noticed, Levinson's approach to constitutional interpretation also has a "catholic"
side. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 29 (describing as "catholic" the position that "the source of doctrine is the
text of the Constitution plus unwritten tradition"), 47 (endorsing a "Dworkinian" model of
constitutional interpretation, in which "the law is intertwined with the ordinary moral understandings
of the given social order").
78. Id. at 88.
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"Constitution" to which one is invited to add one's signature, and about exactly
what one would mean, or what one would do, by signing, Levinson conveys that
these are matters that each reader, in the end, must resolve for himself-albeit in
legal spirit, with honest accountability to a "Word (or Law)" that is not entirely of
one's own, on-the-spot creation.7 9
In the end, it becomes plain: "faith" for Levinson is inseparable from
judgment, albeit judgment under uncertainty. When Levinson says that the
question posed to visitors by the Philadelphia exhibitors is one of faith, he really
means the opposite. He means that "unthinking devotion" to the Constitution is
out of the question for anyone morally alert.80 He means there is nothing "built
into" the notion of law to guarantee that this law will be "worthy of respect, 8 1 and
that, as a matter of fact, this law obviously has such a morally clouded past,82 and
stands today as such a morally flawed instrument,83 that a choice to endorse it and
accordingly regulate one's conduct runs a major risk of being wrong-not empty,
mind you, but wrong.
That is much, but not quite all, of what I think Levinson is doing with the
notion of constitutional faith. Additionally, there is the suggestion-and isn't this
the plausible way, really, to understand Huntington and Wright?-that
Americans, as a matter of observed fact, show a remarkable tractability regarding
the merit of their Constitution and its suitability to them, and hence are
remarkably ready to submit to laws and executions of laws that persuasively claim
the Constitution as their source and justification. It is not that judging the
Constitution favorably (or not) is what "makes" someone American (or not). It is
rather that those who are American tend in fact to judge the Constitution
favorably. The cause could be something in the water here. More likely, it's
something in or about the Constitution combined with something in the American
experience or "mind"-caught, foreseen, or instigated by the framers, more power
to them. A person who judged the Constitution unfavorably, to the point of
"rejecting" it, would seem to be standing outside the American mainstream. But
that is not to say that what keeps insiders inside is "faith," in the sternest religious
understanding of that notion. In matters concerning civic attachment and
79. See supra n. 14 and accompanying text.
80. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 54.
81. Id. (emphasis omitted).
82. Chattel slavery, he says, and by extension race, "is surely the most difficult problem presented
[to] those who would celebrate the Constitution . I..." d. at 186-87.
83. "[W]hat reason," he asks, "do persons mired in poverty have to be wildly appreciative of
negative rights...? Should a homeless resident of Philadelphia, whose interest in the Second Bank of
the United States might be primarily as a shelter from the storm, necessarily sign any extant version of
the Constitution?" Id. at 190. Levinson suggests that the present system is seriously flawed in other
respects, referring to a widely noted report by a group of eminent citizens calling themselves the
Commission on the Constitutional System. See id.; Comm. on the Constitutional System, A
Bicentennial Analysis of the American Political Structure: Report and Recommendations of the
Committee on the Constitutional System (1987) (twenty page report and recommendations). For an
account of some of the Commission's views, see Lloyd N. Cutler, Political Parties and Workable
Government, in A Workable Government? The Constitution after 200 Years 49 (Burke Marshall ed.,
W.W. Norton & Co. 1987).
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obligation, Levinson will have none of that. What he demands of us there, on
moral grounds, is reasoned, reflective choice.
III. WHY A "CATHOLIC" CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACT IS UNLIKELY
A major point in Levinson's teaching, I have said, is that a reasoned choice
to endorse the Constitution, and accordingly regulate one's conduct, runs a
genuine risk of being wrong. Among the most important dimensions of conduct to
be regulated, I have suggested,84 is acceptance and general support of the
government's disposition to demand everyone's compliance with all
constitutionally enacted laws and legal interpretations, including the ones that are
not at all nice in your eyes or in mine, and to back its demands by force where
needed. How far any of us buys into that dimension of civic obligation, I have
suggested, must probably depend on the margins (they might be negative) by
which we severally judge or assume the overall practice of government in our
country to be, on the whole, respect-worthy.
I now can state with considerable precision the question on which I seek
light from Levinson. Suppose we make a very optimistic assumption along the
lines of that empirical observation I have just been describing, that Americans
tend strongly to cotton to the Constitution. Suppose we assume that everyone
alive today in United States territory has gone on pilgrimage to Philadelphia and
signed up. Have we, then, achieved a virtual social contract to treat the overall
system as respect-worthy-and each law issuing from it, therefore, as justifiably
enforceable against everyone-for as long as the frequency of unconstitutional
law-making, or law-interpretation, remains below some threshold of tolerance?
I have argued elsewhere that the answer cannot easily be "yes" for anyone
who looks at matters from what we now may call a "catholic" standpoint.85 That
argument can briefly, if crudely, be summarized as follows:
(1) The "contract" we have under consideration is one that would bind the
contractors to support coercion against others and accept it against themselves.
(2) We stipulate that no one can accept such an obligation rationally, or with
due responsibility to others and to the self, without first having judged for herself,
independently, that the terms of agreement really are such that everyone who will
be bound by these terms has good enough reasons (of theirs, not just of ours) to
accept the terms-that being what it is, in a liberal view, for a constituted system
of government to be respect-worthy.86
84. See infra pt. 11.
85. See Michelman, supra n. 4, at pt. V(c); Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Legitimation for
Political Acts, 66 Modern L. Rev. 1 (2003).
86. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 139-40 (Columbia U. Press 1993) ("[S]ince political power
is the coercive power of ... citizens as a corporate body, this power should be exercised ... only in
ways that all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of their common human
reason."). See Michelman, supra n. 4, at pt. IV(B) ("When we conclude, in the teeth of another's
protest, that it is morally okay for us to join in mobilization of compulsion against that other to comply
with a given law, we feel it is incumbent on us to be able to give reasons that she has-that everyone
has-to accept this as the general social practice."). Because (2) is a stipulation with which not
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(3) No one can make such a judgment without knowing what the terms of
agreement relevantly are.
(4) Think of the Constitution prior to or apart from the accumulated set of
the Supreme Court's interpretive rulings. Whether one conceives of this un-
interpreted Constitution as text alone or ("catholically") as text-plus,87 its terms
are relatively open and abstract and a great many of its major applications fairly
debatable. The text-plus, after all, is still rooted in language, and Levinson
reminds us of "how unlikely it is that presumed agreement on the importance of
abstract words will in fact still the disputes that required negotiation in the first
place. 8 8  Now think about a person "catholically" disposed to equate the
Constitution's meanings-in-application with whatever the Supreme Court rules.
She is trying to decide whether to sign. Can she possibly-rationally-decide
without waiting forever to see how the Supreme Court will rule? Only the Court's
relatively concrete decisions, and not the un-interpreted text or text-plus, can tell
her what the deal is regarding such questions as: which governmental department
or branch decides a contested election of presidential electors;89 which decides the
scope of legal protections for women 9° or the disabled; 91 if the unborn are
constitutionally protected from harm;92 if convicts may be put to death by the
state;93 if devotion of public revenues to private or religious education is allowed;
94
if regulatory control of spending in elections is allowed;95 if affirmative action is
allowed;96 if homelessness and starvation are allowed;97 how far private hate
speech may be regulated;98 how far liberty may be sacrificed to security (or
security to liberty) in times of national danger; and so on.
(5) If we try to avoid the problem by saying that the complete constitutional
contract consists of the text or text-plus together with the up-to-the-minute
complete series of United States Reports, will that be something you or I can say
confidently must be deemed respect-worthy by every reasonable American?
(6) If, alternatively, we try to avoid the problem by falling back on the text
or the text-plus as the set of terms for a system of government on which we can
count for every reasonable American's agreement, is there enough information
everyone may agree, the argument in the essays cited in supra note 85 is expressly presented as one
that holds only for those who do agree with it.
87. See supra pt. I(A).
88. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 125.
89. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
90. See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
91. See Bd. of Trustees of U. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
92. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
93. See e.g. Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
94. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
95. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
96. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
97. See e.g. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
98. R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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there about what the deal is, to make it reasonable to demand everyone's
authorization of coercion on the basis only of that?99
For present purposes, it does not matter whether you accept this argument
as finally conclusive against the idea of a "catholic" constitutional contract, but
only that you catch its drift. Assuming everyone is "catholic," an obvious dilemma
plagues the case for a constructive constitutional contract. A contract containing
the Supreme Court's rulings as terms could be too "thick" to be a plausible object
of universal free acceptance, but a contract comprised only of the constitutional
text or text-plus could be too "thin"-too short of complete or adequately
informative-to bear the weight of justification of civic coercion.
IV. TOWARDS A PROTESTANT CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACT?
If everyone is assumed "protestant," the last-mentioned dilemma seems to
disappear. Among protestants-and this would seem especially true of Levinson-
style "catholic-protestants"1 -the Constitution quite easily can be imagined
agreeable at every moment to everyone. Everyone, after all, is expected to arrive
at his or her own determinations of what the Constitution truly says and requires,
by application of morally informed reason to a rich and varied array of sources.
But this, I expect you will say, is craziness. Among protestants, you will say,
the claim of a constructive constitutional contract never gets off the ground
because there is no "meeting of the minds." The Constitution is the Peerless.10
You have yours in mind, and I have mine, and how shall the twain meet? A
protestant-style constructive constitutional contract is an idea doomed from the
start. Are you sure? Would Sanford Levinson agree? Let us see.
Some time back, we left Levinson locked in a struggle to find some place of
repose between his concern that attachment to the Constitution might lack any
real, obligatory "bite" and his belief in the substantial prescriptive plasticity of
constitutional-legal materials. As Levinson points out, it does not follow from that
plasticity that the Constitution and constitutional law are not constantly presiding
over American politics, in a very real way. "Constitution-talk," says Levinson,
provides a distinctive American vocabulary for debates over major issues of public
policy. It supplies a grid of "'common language"' for use when Americans
collectively choose to process verbally, and not by other means, their
disagreements about "'the distribution and use of power in our society."'"" 2 In that
sense, the Constitution is constantly, so to speak, on duty. But if-as Levinson
also says-the linguistic system that the Constitution undoubtedly does constitute
is so supple, so "'indeterminate,"'' 03 that one can use it to take any side on "[any]
99. See Frank 1. Michelman, The Problem of Constitutional Interpretive Disagreement: Can
"Discourses of Application" Help?, in Habermas and Pragmatism 113 (Mitchell Aboulafia, Myra
Bookman & Catherine Kemp eds., Routledge 2002).
100. See supra n. 11 and accompanying text.
101. See Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
102. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 191 (quoting H. Jefferson Powell, What the Constitution Means for Your
Town, and for You, Des Moines Register 13a (Dec. 18, 1986)).
103. Id. (Levinson's scare-quotes).
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important political issue imaginable"-if nothing is "unsayable" in that language,
nothing securely "'off-the-wall""° 4-then why should anyone sweat the oath that
commits them to nothing except use of this all-but-infinitely plastic language?
The plasticity of the constitutional language turns out to be its saving grace.
Sandy can sign, as he wants to, without committing himself to any conversational
"closure,"1 °5 which he doesn't want to, and yet also without committing himself to
nothing, which he also doesn't want to. By signing, he commits himself to
something important, that being respect and support for this very political-
conversational non-closure! Linguistic plasticity becomes the kernel of a political
and social system to which one indeed can make a heart-felt commitment,
incurring thereby a true obligation: to "tak[e] political conversation seriously."'
0 6
The Constitution, in effect, is reduced to that one principle of obligation, which
entails both supporting such conversations and supporting the use of the powers of
government to maintain them.0 7 Now, this is hardly nothing. It is one version-
the closing version, one might say-of the new-world "proposition" that Lincoln
said the Union armies fought to save: government by the people, conducted by
ballots, not bullets.0 8
So have we here-could it be?-a happy ending?0 9 Levinson does end up
getting two things at once, both of which he values very highly, that it's not at all
obvious how to put together: commitment to a national joint political venture and
retention of moral independence (non-"closure"). Why, then, does Sandy sweat?
The way I see it, he doesn't in fact sweat over signing, once he's got the question of
what he's signing satisfactorily sorted out. It is the sorting-out-the shaping of
constitutional-legal obligation into that one, democratic proposition-that causes
the sweat.
May we read this, then, as Levinson's proposal for a "protestant"
constitutional contract? One that would oblige every "signer" to accept without
grievance enforcement of whatever laws and legal interpretations emanate from
"the system," as long as the principle of robustly democratic, "conversational"
decisionmaking remains substantially unmolested at the system's heart? Couldn't
everyone in sight-at least everyone who understands and accepts both the need
104. Id. at 191-92.
105. Id. at 193.
106. Id. Compare Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 14 (Princeton U.
Press 1999) ("The... principles [of the Declaration of Independence] define our fundamental law.
Vigorous disagreement over what those principles mean for any specific problem of public policy does
not mean that we as a society have no fundamental law in common.") For Levinson's subsequent
endorsement of Tushnet's view, see Balkin & Levinson, supra n. 59, at 178.
107. See Levinson, supra n. 2, at 193.
108. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln vol. 7, at 23 (Roy B. Basler ed., Rutgers U. Press
1953) (Gettysburg Address) (compare the first and last sentences); The Collected Works of Abraham
Lincoln vol. 4, at 439 (Roy B. Basler ed., Rutgers U. Press 1953) (Message to Congress in Special
Session, July 4, 1861). For persuasive reduction to one proposition of what may look like three-all
men created equal, government by the people, ballots not bullets-along with persuasive imputation of
the reduction to Lincoln, see Jaffa, supra n. 66, at passim.
109. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Sanford Levinson, Introduction: Constitutional Conversations, in
Constitutional Stupidities, Constitutional Tragedies 1, 8 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Sanford Levinson
eds., N.Y. U. Press 1998).
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for government by law and the created-equal status of all of humankind-be fairly
called upon to sign on to that Constitution, that "proposition?" How could signing
on to it compromise independence of anyone's moral or legal judgment? True,
the proposition would commit you to respect the laws found fit for your country
by its people acting collectively, through procedures in which you could be
outvoted. But you would be bound only insofar as you continued to judge that
these collective actions have occurred through certain processes, in certain social
conditions, under certain rules and guarantees (a bill of rights)-all of these
standards existing independently of you (as "the Word (or Law)")" ° but being
construed by you in such a way as to add up, in your eyes, to a true practice of
democracy.
A court might reject as "illusory" a contract based on such a promise. '
Even so, such a promise maybe too much for anyone truly "protestant" to make,
and for that we have the word of Sanford Levinson. "[E]ven my 'best'
Constitution might at times come into conflict with what I regard as my most
important moral commitments," Levinson writes at the end of Constitutional
Faith, and then "it would be the Constitution that (I hope) would give way."' 112
May we perceive there the workings of a thought closely akin to one that others
often have expressed by denying that democracy trumps justice, and denying also
that justice either is reducible to democracy or fully derivable from it?"3 If you
buy that denial-and it seems Levinson does-then neither a "catholic" nor a
"protestant" constitutional contract is going to seem a very plausible idea.
110. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 25; see text accompanying supra note 14.
1ll. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2 cmt. e (1981).
112. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 193.
113. See e.g. James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
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